Introduction
The European Union has produced a remarkable set of agreements to guide the political interactions of countries across Europe in the past fifty years. These agreements have produced collective rules governing market transactions of all varieties, created a single currency, established a rule of law that includes a European court, and promoted increased interactions for people who live within the boundaries of Europe. Moreover, the EU has expanded from six to twenty-seven countries. The endpoint of the EU has been left intentionally vague and can be encapsulated by the ambiguous phrase "toward an ever closer union."
Much of the political criticism of the EU has focussed on the lack of transparency in its procedures and in its accountability to a larger democratic public (Baun 1996; Dinan 2002; McCormick 2002) . Many of Europe's citizens have little knowledge about the workings of the EU (Gabel 1998) . This lack of "connectedness" to the EU by ordinary citizens has caused scholars to try to understand why a European identity (equivalent to a "national" identity), a European "civil society," and a European politics have been so slow to emerge (Laffan et al. 2000) . The main focus of these efforts is why, after fifty years of the integration project, there is so little evidence of public attitudes that reflect more feelings of solidarity across Europe. Even among those who work in Brussels, there are mixed feelings about being European (Hooghe 2005; Beyer 2005) .
I argue that the literature has so far failed to understand how it is that some people across Europe are likely to adopt a European identity and some are not. I propose that the main source of such an identity is the opportunity to positively interact on a regular basis with people from other European countries with whom one has a basis for solidarity. Since this opportunity is restricted to a certain part of the population, it follows that not everyone in Europe is likely to adopt a European identity. Moreover, those who have this opportunity tend to be the most privileged strata of society: managers, professionals, white collar workers, educated people, and young people. This paper provides evidence that it is precisely these groups who tend to think of themselves as Europeans, speak second languages, report having traveled to another member state in the past twelve months, and have joined European-wide organizations.
This unevenness of interaction with others in Europe has produced a counter effect. Those who have not benefited from travel and from the psychic and financial rewards of learning about and interacting with people from other countries have been less favorable toward the European project (see Holmes 2000 for a discussion of how some of these people have viewed what it means to be a "European" through the "Le Pen effect"). I will show that substantial numbers of people in Europe sometimes think of themselves as Europeans; but there remains a large group, somewhere around 45 percent, who are wedded to their national identity. This suggests several key dynamics for politics.
First, national political parties have responded to the pro-European position of middle-and upper-middle-class citizens by opting for a proEuropean platform over time. I show that center-left/center-right parties in England, France, and Germany have all converged on a proEuropean political agenda. This reflects their desire to avoid alienating core groups for whom European integration has been a good thing. In this way, the "Europeans" (that is, middle-and upper-middle-class people in each of the member states) have had an important effect on national politics. But parties on the far Left and far Right are full of people for whom Europe has not been a good thing. Right-wing parties worry about Europe undermining the nation, and they thrive on nationalist sentiment. Left-wing parties view the economic integration wrought by the single market as globalization and hence a capitalist plot to undermine the welfare state.
Second, the way in which particular political issues have played out across Europe depends on how the "situational Europeans" (that is, those who sometimes think of themselves as Europeans) come to favor or not favor a European solution to a particular political problem. Frequently, such groups examine these issues from the point of view of their own interest and that of the nation. They pressure their governments to respond to their interests and to undermine a broader possibility for European cooperation. But if those who sometimes think of themselves as Europeans recognize that a particular political issue should be resolved at the European level, they will support more European cooperation.
The paper has the following structure. First, I consider the issue of how to think about European identity. I suggest a set of hypotheses about who are most likely to think of themselves as Europeans. Next, I provide data that is consistent with the hypotheses. I then show how the main political parties in the largest countries have sought out these voters by taking pro-European positions. In the conclusion, I discuss the issue of the "shallowness" of European identity and the problem this presents for the EU going forward.
Theoretical considerations
European economic integration has been good for jobs and employment across Europe. It has changed the patterns of social interaction around Europe. Over 100 million Europeans travel across national borders for business and pleasure every year, and at least 10-20 million go to school, retire, or work for extended periods across national borders (for an elaboration, see Fligstein 2008b; for a view of how working abroad changes one's identity, see Favell 2008a). This experience of citizens in other countries has been mostly positive. People have gotten to know their counterparts in other societies, appreciated their cultural traditions, and begun to see themselves as having more in common. These positive interactions have caused some of them to identify as "Europeans."
Sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists have been interested in the formation of collective identities since the founding of their disciplines (for a critical review of the concept of identity in the postwar social science literature, see Brubaker and Cooper 2000) . Collective identities refer to the idea that a group of people accepts a fundamental and consequential sameness that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Therborn 1995, ch. 12) . This sense of collective identity is socially constructed, by which I mean that it emerges as the intentional or unintentional consequence of social interactions. Collective identity is also by definition about the construction of an "other." Our idea of who we are is usually framed as a response to some "other" group (Barth 1969) . Collective identities are anchored in sets of conscious and unconscious meanings that people share. People grow up in families and communities, and they come to identify with the groups in which they are socially located. Gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, social class, and age have all been the basis of people's main identities and their central relationships to various communities.
2 National identity is one form of collective identity. Deutsch defined nationality as "a people striving to equip itself with power, with some machinery of compulsion strong enough to make the enforcement of its commands probable in order to aid in the spread of habits of voluntary compliance with them" (1953, p. 104) . But in order to attain this, there has to be an alliance among the members of disparate social groups. "Nationality, then, means an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the lower and middle classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic discourse, both indirectly from link to link with the center" (1953, p. 101 ).
Deutsch's approach helps makes sense of one of the most obvious difficulties with a theory of nationality. In different times and places, the basis of an appeal to a common culture can include language, religion, race, ethnicity, or a common formative experience (for example, in the US, immigration). Deutsch makes us understand that any of these common cultures can form the pre-existing basis of a national identity; which one gets used in a particular society will depend on history. The historical "trick" to the rise of a nation-state will be to find a horizontal kind of solidarity that is appealing to a wide group of people of differing social strata, offering a sense of solidarity that justifies producing a state 2 In this chapter, I lack the space to consider more adequately the problem of how people become socialized to identities. For a critical discussion of the use of the concept "identity" in the postwar era, see Brubaker and Cooper (2000) . For a view from the social psychological literature, see Tajfel (1981) and Turner (1975) . For a discussion of identity formation as socialization applied to the EU, see Checkel (2005) . For a consideration of how people might hold conflicting multiple identities including national, regional and local identities, see Brewer and Gardner (1996 ), Brewer (1993 , 1999 , Risse (2004) , Risse et al. (1999 ), Díez Medrano (2003 ), and Díez Medrano and Gutierrez (2001 .
to protect the "nation." Nationalism can have any cultural root, as long as that culture can be used to forge a cross-class alliance around a nation-building project. Deutsch recognized that not all forms of social interaction between groups were positive (1969) . Groups who interacted could easily become conflictual if they came to view their interests and identities as competitive and antithetical. In this way, national identity could be a source of conflict for groups in a society who did not think of themselves as belonging to the nation and, if the patterns of interaction became conflictual, could result in some groups deciding to form a new or alternative nation. Thus, in order for a national identity to emerge, groups needed to come to a positive sense of solidarity based on the idea that they were all members of a single overarching group. National identities were also frequently imposed on unwilling groups through conquest or subordination (Tilly 1975; Gellner 1983) . Subsequent attempts to theorize nationalism have focussed on understanding how these conflictual mechanisms might be institutionalized or overcome (Tilly 1975; Gellner 1983; Rokkan 1973; Breuilly 1993; Brubaker 1992 ).
Deutsch's theory helps us make sense of what has and has not happened in Europe in the past fifty years. If there is going to be a European national identity, it will arise from people who associate with each other across national boundaries and experience that association in a positive way. As European economic, social, and political fields have developed, they imply the routine interaction of people from different societies. It is the people involved in these routine interactions who are most likely to come to see themselves as Europeans and involved in a European national project. They will come to see that their counterparts in other countries are more like them than unlike them, and to relate to their counterparts as part of an overarching group in Europe, "Europeans."
Who are these people? My evidence suggests that these include the owners of businesses, managers, professionals, and other white collar workers who are involved in various aspects of business and government. These people travel for business and live in other countries for short periods. They engage in long term social relationships with their counterparts who work for their firm, are their suppliers, customers, or in the case of people who work for governments, their colleagues in other governments. They speak second languages for work. Since 1986, they have created Europe-wide business and professional associations, where people gather yearly to discuss matters of mutual interest. Young people who travel across borders for schooling, tourism, and jobs (often for a few years after college) are also likely to be more European. Educated people who share common interests with educated people around Europe -such as similar professions, interests in charitable organizations, or social and cultural activities like opera or art -will be interested in travel and social interaction with people in other societies. People with higher incomes will travel more and participate in the diverse cultural life across Europe. They will have the money to spend time enjoying the good life in other places.
If these are the people who are most likely to interact in Europe-wide economic, social, and political arenas, then it follows that their opposites lack either the opportunity or the interest to interact with their counterparts across Europe. Most importantly, blue collar and service workers are less likely than managers, professionals, and other white collar workers to have their jobs take them to other countries. Older people will be less adventurous than younger people and less likely to know other languages. They are less likely to hold favorable views of their neighbors and more likely to remember who was on which side in World War II. They will be less likely to want to associate with or to have curiosity about people from neighboring countries. People who hold conservative political views that value the "nation" as the most important category will not want to travel, know, or interact with people who are "not like them." When they do, they will not be attracted to the "others" but instead will emphasize their cultural differences. Finally, less educated and less financially well off people will lack the inclination to be attracted to the cultural diversity of Europe and be less able to afford to travel.
If I am right, this suggests that the basic conditions for a European national identity as posited by Deutsch have not been met. A cross-class alliance based on forms of shared culture and patterns of interaction has not emerged in Europe. Instead, the patterns of shared culture and interaction that have occurred across European borders have exactly followed social class lines. People who tend to think of themselves as European represent the more privileged members of society, while people who tend to think of themselves as mainly national in identity tend to be less privileged.
Sociologists tend to think that it is difficult to separate out the rational (that is, self interested) from the affective component of identity (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000) . Identities involve worldviews about who we are, what we want, what we think, and most important, how we interpret the actions and intentions of others. Implicit in this understanding of identity is that people often come to identify with a group of others because we share common interests (material and otherwise). In this way, an identity acts as a cultural frame that tells us who we are and how we ought to act. This view of identity embeds our sense of "what our interests are" in our sense of who we think we are in a particular situation. This conception of identity is as much cultural as it is normative.
Gabel (1998) demonstrates that people who have something to gain from the EU -professionals, managers, educated people, farmers, and the well off financially -are also more likely to be in favor of its activities. I produce results that support Gabel's view. My goal is to broaden his view of why these privileged groups are Europeans and why they support the EU. It is certainly the case that these groups have benefited materially from the EU. European integration has been first and foremost about creating a single market. But this market integration project has had the unintended outcome of giving some groups more opportunities to interact with people from other societies. These interactions have given them firsthand experience of their counterparts in other countries and made them feel positive affect for people who are like them.
The issues of identity, interest, and interaction are difficult to untangle, both theoretically and empirically. For example, if one is a businessperson who depends on trade for one's livelihood, one is likely to spend time in other countries and get to know people from those societies. This interaction will reveal common interests and a common set of understandings. People will develop friendships and get to know other people with whom they will come to share a deeper identity. So, an Italian businessman who befriends a French businessman will find they share a common interest in having more opportunity to interact. They will come to see each other less as Italian and French and thus, foreign, and more as sharing common interests. These common interests will eventually bring them to see themselves more as Europeans and less as just having national identity. Of course, to the degree that these relationships are driven by material interest (i.e. the selling and buying of things), affect is more difficult to separate from interest.
These fictitious businesspeople begin by interacting with one another for business. They discover that people from other societies who occupy similar social positions are not so different from themselves. This makes them see that national identities are limiting and that a European identity gives them more freedom to associate with others who are really like them in other societies. They are all educated, rational people who prefer to find win-win situations, who prefer compromise to conflict, and who accept cultural differences as interesting and stimulating. It should not be surprising that the "agents" of European identity should be the educated middle-and upper-middle classes who espouse Enlightenment ideology.
3 After all, the Enlightenment reflected the cultural conception of those classes in the eighteenth century.
Evidence for "Who is a European"
I begin my search for Europeans by examining a number of datasets: three Eurobarometers that gather public opinion data, and a dataset I gathered on the founding of European-wide associations that was collected from the International Handbook of Nongovernmental Organizations. The appendix at the end of this chapter contains information on the data and measures reported in the tables in this paper. I begin with the Eurobarometer data. Table 6 .1 reports on the degree to which people across Europe view themselves as Europeans. Only 3.9 percent of people who live in Europe view themselves as Europeans exclusively, while another 8.8 percent view themselves as Europeans and having some national identity. This means that only 12.7 percent of people in Europe tend to view themselves as Europeans. I note that this translates into 47 million people, a large number! Scholars who have looked at this data generally conclude that the European identity has not spread very far (Gabel 1998; Deflem and Pampel 1996) . 4 3 Habermas (1992) views a European identity is part of the idea of completing the Enlightenment project. He argues that "reason" and "rationality" should guide people's interactions. Being a European is about trying to settle differences peaceably with respect for differences and others' opinions. A European state would be democratic and ideally would follow the creation of a European civil society where rational differences of opinion could be aired. Finally, he has recently argued that Europe should also stand for social justice and defense of the welfare state (2001) . Such an identity, of course, was associated during the Enlightenment with the rising middle classes and in contemporary Europe with social democracy. 4 In this volume, Favell presents interview data on people who have moved to other countries to live and work. His sample reflects people who are at the extreme tail of my distribution here.
But this misses several interesting aspects of European identity. An additional 43.3 percent of people view themselves as having a national identity and sometimes a European identity (while 44 percent of people never view themselves as having anything but a national identity). The 43.3 percent of people who sometimes view themselves as Europeans can be viewed as "situational Europeans," that is, under the right conditions they will place a European identity over a national identity. So, if the right issue comes along, 56 percent of people will favor a European solution to a problem. If, however, all of the situational Europeans remain true to their national identity, 87.3 percent of people will be anti-European. This complex pattern of identity explains much about the ups and downs of the European political project. One can predict that most of the time, most of the population who live in Europe will see things from either a nationalist or a self interested perspective. But occasionally, issues will arise that will bring together majorities of the population around a European perspective. Table 6 .2 reports the results of a logit analysis predicting whether or not a person has any European identity. The dependent variable in the analysis is whether or not the person ever thinks of him/herself as primarily a European (i.e. the 56%) or as only having a national identity (i.e. the 44%). Here, the class bias of European identity is clearly revealed. People who are more educated, have higher incomes, and are owners, managers, professionals, or white collar workers are more likely to see themselves as European than people who are less educated, have lower incomes, and are blue collar. There are several suggestive demographic effects. Young people are more likely to see themselves as European than are old people, and men are more likely to see themselves as European than are women. This is consistent with our argument that young people and men have more opportunities to travel and interact with their counterparts in other countries, either for fun or for work. Finally, people who judge themselves as left wing politically are more likely than people who view themselves as right wing politically to be European. Since most right-wing parties in Europe favor the nation and national discourse, it makes sense that people in such parties would not have a European identity and would be against the EU more generally. This analysis clearly supports a class-centered view of who the Europeans are. But it does not directly consider why those people might be Europeans. Here, I turn to other datasets to explore more carefully Deutsch's hypothesis that interaction produces common identity. One problem in the Eurobarometers is that the European identity questions have been asked infrequently and never in concert with questions about social interactions. So, I have to pursue a more indirect strategy in order to link the social class background with opportunities to interact across Europe. I do this by choosing two indicators of social interaction: second language use, and data on European travel. The acquisition of a second language only makes sense if one intends to use it for business or travel. It is difficult to learn a second language, and if one does not use the language, it quickly disappears. People who intend to interact with others in different societies in a significant way are more likely to make the investment in a second language. I argue that the people who will make this investment will reflect those who have the opportunity to learn such languages and use them, that is, the young, the educated, and those with white collar and professional occupations. An even more direct indicator of interacting with people from other societies is direct report of recent travel experiences. If people report having traveled to other countries recently, then it is a fair bet that they do so relatively frequently. If it is true that interaction produces collective identity, then the same people who have a European identity (again the young, the educated and white collar and professionals) will report traveling to other European societies more frequently. Table 6 .3 shows that 61.6 percent of people in Europe claim to speak a second language, as reported in a Eurobarometer conducted in 2000. This result should be interpreted with some caution. The actual level of skill in a second language was not directly measured by the survey. This was a self report and so one cannot be sure of its validity. Even if the degree to which Europeans actually speak second languages is overstated, the distribution of those languages and the relationship between speaking a second language and age is what one would predict: 57.5% of those who speak a second language report that language is English, 15.6% report the second language is French, and 11.3% report their second language is German. This variable is heavily skewed by age: 82.4% of people aged 15-24 claim to speak a second language, while only 34.1% of those 65 and above do so. There are also clear national differences in second language usage. The British have the lowest use of second languages, reflecting their clear advantage with English as the language of business. At the other extreme, 97.7 percent of Luxembourgois report speaking a second language. In general, people from smaller countries are more likely to speak second languages than people from larger countries. 5   Table 6 .2 also presents the results of a logit regression where the model predicts which social groups were more likely to speak a second language. Here, I observe once again the effects of social class. People who are educated, and who are owners, professionals, managers, white collar, and not in the labor force all report higher levels of second language use than the less educated or blue collar workers do. One of the strongest 5 It is interesting to note that citizens of small countries generally have more European identity, speak second languages more, and travel more. Obviously, if you live in a small country, you need to know more than one language, and your opportunity to travel involves less time and money. But it also means that you are more aware of your neighbors, are more likely to interact with them frequently, and thus, more likely to see yourself as more like them. effects in the model is the effect of age. All Europeans are pushed to learn second languages in schools (with the exception of the British). This shows up clearly in the model. Language use is an indicator of social interaction of people across countries, and then there is a clear link between patterns of social interaction and social class position. Table 6 .4 presents data on whether or not the respondent in the survey has been in another European country in the past twelve months. These data come from a Eurobarometer conducted in 1997. Of those surveyed, 75.1% answered "no," while 24.9% answered "yes." These data show quite a bit of variation across country as well. Generally, people who live in the poorer countries in the South, like Greece, Spain, and Portugal, report traveling the least. People in the rich countries like Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden travel the most. Another interpretation of this data is that people in the North tend to travel more, suggesting that part of this travel is for recreation, not just for business. This makes my measure of interaction more problematic. It could be argued that tourists get on a plane, arrive at a beach where they are surrounded by their fellow citizens, and barely interact with the locals. While one must be cautious in overinterpreting the results of the analysis, the explanatory factors that work for the other variables hold up for this one as well. Table 6 .2 also presents results from a logit analysis where the dependent variable was whether or not a person had traveled outside of their country in the past twelve months. The effects in this analysis mirror the effects in the analysis of who regards him/herself as a European and who speaks a second language. The class differences are quite apparent, as educated people and people who are owners, managers, professionals, and white collar workers travel more than less educated people and blue collar workers. This is the most direct evidence I have for the idea that interaction patterns follow social class lines. There are several other interesting effects in the models. Old people are less likely to travel than young people, and women less than men. This implies that both women and the elderly encounter people from other countries less frequently than do men or young people. People who are more right wing than left wing in their politics are also less likely to travel net of social class. This implies that people who tend to value the nation over Europe do not travel to foreign countries for work or pleasure.
These results provide strong, albeit indirect support for the idea that people who tend to think of themselves as Europeans are people who are more likely to interact with others across Europe. Managers, professionals, white collar, educated people, and males and the young are all more likely to report having been in another European country in the past twelve months, being able to speak a second language, and having a European identity. This conforms to my view that the EU has provided the opportunity for interaction for the most privileged members of society and that these members of all European countries are more likely to be European.
A European civil society?
One could argue that the evidence presented can easily be accounted for by "interest" driven arguments. That is, the EU has benefited these groups materially; it is no surprise that they favor Europe and think of themselves as Europeans. From this point of view, their speaking second languages and traveling abroad is not a cause of their identity, but an effect of their material interests. They make money by being able to travel and speak second languages and so it should be no surprise that they think of themselves as European. This is a difficult argument to refute with the data. Indeed, it is possible to see that interest and identity are wrapped up together. But it is useful to put together one other dataset that measures the likelihood of interaction. One frequent claim is that if there are going to be Europeans, there needs to be a European "civil society" (Laffan et al. 2000) . The definition of exactly what this would be is contestable (Calhoun 2003) .
Here, I take a standard view and argue that one measure of a Europewide civil society is the existence of Europe-wide organizations or associations. My earlier results showed that people who tend to think of themselves as Europeans and who are more likely to travel or speak second languages are managers, professionals, the educated, and the young. I expect that the main Europe-wide associations founded by these people will be professional, scientific, trade, and interest group associations like hobby groups or special interest groups like environmental or peace groups. Professionals and middle-and upper-middleclass people create groups that reflect their occupational, political, and cultural interests. Professional, scientific, and trade groups reflect the interests of the educated and those involved in political and economic exchange to meet routinely. Social and cultural groups reflect the founding of a true European civil society, a society of nonprofits oriented toward charity and social activities that brings people together from around Europe. Their members will also be predominately the middle class, the upper middle class, and the educated and young in general.
If European political, social, and economic integration has increased over time, one would expect that the number of Europe-wide associations would increase, as these people would have the chance to routinize their interactions with each other by setting up nonprofit groups that would meet routinely to discuss matters of joint interest. This should particularly expand after 1985, when the EU began to complete the single market, thereby increasing the opportunities for interaction to occur.
The data I collected came from the Yearbook of International Organizations (2000). I created a database with every organization that was set up on a European basis. I eliminated organizations that were explicitly founded to lobby in Brussels. I was able to code 989 organizations. Figure 6 .1a presents the founding of these organizations over time. Between 1959 and 1985 , there were an average twenty such organizations founded each year. Starting in 1985 with the announcement of the Single Market, the number of organizations spiked to a peak of 58 founded in 1990, and dropped off thereafter. I note that this dropoff is partially due to the biasses inherent in the data source. The International Handbook of Nongovernmental Organizations is slow to add organizations once they are founded, as they need to discover the 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 year Number of Organizations Founded 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3
Number of Organizations existence of the organizations in order to add them to their database. This shows that the creation of such organizations was highly related to the increasing opportunity for people to meet and interact in the wake of the Single Market. Figure 6 .1b shows that the vast majority of organizations founded were professional and scientific organizations. A typical professional or scientific organization would be the European Association of Chiropractors or the European Association of Meteorologists. The third largest group was business or trade associations. Here, a typical association might be the European Association of Direct Marketing or the European Association of Chemical Producers. The most interesting part of the graph is the increase in sports/hobby organizations and nonprofit organizations after 1984. In the sports hobby category are included the European Association of Mushroom Gatherers or the European Association of Bicycling. In the nonprofit category are organizations such as the European Societies of Cancer and the European Save the Whales Association. These are the purest form of civil society organizations, in that they reflect how citizens decide to devote resources to Europe-wide organizations with no obvious material interest. While these organizations comprise a relatively small percentage of all organizations (about 15 percent of all cases), they show clearly that in the wake of the Single Market, some people took the opportunity to interact across national borders.
The vast majority of these organizations' main activities are to meet annually somewhere in Europe to discuss matters of mutual interest. These conferences and conventions are frequently held in warm and pleasant places. Like all professional meetings, the more instrumental purposes are supplemented by partying, networking, and vacationing. These conferences bring about increased interaction across national borders and furnish their participants with new friends, job contacts, and business opportunities. They are part and parcel of what creates Europe.
How should this matter for politics?
It is useful to summarize the results so far. Only about 12.7% of Europe's population basically sees itself as European. These people are disproportionately the most privileged members of society, that is, managers, professionals, and white collar people, educated people, and the young. In this way, the European project has given the most opportunities to the people who are already the most privileged. But it is also the case that 56% of people who live in Europe have some European identity: 61.6% claim to speak a second language, and 24.9% have been out of their country in the past year. The educated and the middle and upper middle classes have taken the opportunities afforded by work and pleasure to create new patterns of association. They have founded Europe-wide organizations and associations. While some Europeans are clearly more affected by the EU than others because they have more opportunities to interact with people from other countries routinely, a substantial proportion of Europeans appear to have at least some interactions across borders in their lives. This interaction appears to have some impact on their identities as well.
One of the interesting questions is, what effect does this have on national politics? The assumption in much of the academic literature is that the EU has a democratic deficit. This is usually meant to imply that "average" people feel out of touch with decision-making in Brussels. But this decision-making is undertaken by the member state governments and their representatives in Brussels and the directly elected European Parliament. One obvious reason that "average" people do not experience a democratic deficit is that they still vote for their national politicians and even their representatives for the European Parliament. National political parties take a position on European integration, and voters are able to decide whether this issue is salient enough to them to vote a political party on the basis of this position.
Haas argued that in the 1950s, European integration had no salience for voters across Europe (1958) . He analyzed the political positions of various parties across Europe and observed little support or opposition for the European project. Haas thought that if the project was ever to go anywhere, this would need to change. Subsequent research has revealed that most people have almost no knowledge of the EU and its workings (for a review, see Gabel 1998). But, even here, large and important minorities of people across Europe find European issues salient to their voting. (For an interesting set of arguments that locate support for the EU in national politics, see Díez Medrano 2003).
It is useful to make an argument about why this might be. It follows from our analysis that middle-and upper-middle-class voters benefit directly from Europe, either materially or because they have formed identities whereby they relate to their peers across societies. These are certainly people who tend to vote, and it follows that political parties would want to take political positions on the EU that might attract such voters. While the EU is not going to be the only issue on which voters support parties, it might be one of the important issues (Featherstone 1999). Table 6 .2 explores this hypothesis by considering the determinants of whether the EU is viewed by respondents as good or bad for their country. It shows that 56.2 percent of people in Europe in 2004 viewed the EU as a good thing for their country, while 24.9 percent viewed it as neither a good nor a bad thing for their country and only 19 percent viewed it as altogether a bad thing for their country. A logit analysis is used to separate the determinants of a more positive view of the EU. Once again, the class basis of support for the EU comes through. Higher educated, higher income people, as well as owners, professionals, managers, and white collar workers are more likely to see the EU as a good thing for their country than are those who are lower educated, poor, or blue collar. Gabel (1998) has interpreted this from a rational choice perspective. Since the main beneficiaries of the EU's Single Market have been those who are better off, they continue to support the EU.
But there are a number of other effects in the model that can be given a more interactional and identity spin. Older people feel less positive toward the EU than younger people net of social class. Since younger people are more Europeanized in the sense that they are more likely to travel and speak second languages, it follows that they view the EU in a more positive way. There are two interesting effects of identity in the model. People who describe themselves as left wing are more likely to view the EU as a good thing for their country than are people who are more right wing. Right-wing politics in Europe tend to be more focussed on the "nation," and therefore people with those politics are going to be more skeptical of the EU and its effects on their country. Finally, if a person has some European identity, s/he is more likely to see Europe as a good thing for his/her country. Taken together, these results imply that there are indeed political constituencies within each European country who will favor the EU. Their support reflects both interest driven reasons (i.e. the economic opportunities afforded by the EU) and identity driven reasons (i.e. the opportunities to travel and interact, and the desire to protect the nation from "Europe").
This difference of perspective on the value of the EU has played out in interesting ways in European political parties over time. Since the 1950s, the center left/center right parties in the largest countries across Western Europe have converged in their support of the EU. I believe that this has not occurred as a result of these parties being driven by elites that have converged on this opinion. Instead, political parties on both the Left and the Right have experimented with taking both pro and con EU positions. They have discovered that by and large, even though there may be vocal and active minorities in each country who oppose European political and economic integration, there are not enough of these folks to actually get elected on an anti-EU platform. Moreover, given that middle-and uppermiddle-class voters tend to be pro-EU, and given that these people tend to vote, center left and center right parties chase these votes, eventually realizing that the EU is not a good wedge issue to win elections.
The data used for this analysis come from Budge et al. (2001) . They consist of an analysis of the platforms of political parties across Europe. I present data on the major political parties in England, France, and Germany over time. The variable I present is the negative mentions of the EU in the party platform, subtracted from the positive mentions of the EU in the platforms in a given election year. I choose to present this measure because it taps directly into the degree to which the EU is viewed in a mostly positive or a mostly negative way by each of the political parties.
The data for Germany is presented in Figure 6 .2. All three major German political parties generally have more positive than negative things to say about the EU. This reflects the German political consensus that the EU is a "winning" issue. There is some interesting variation in this variable. In the 1987 election, the Social Democrats increased their negative comments on Europe, while the Christian Democrats increased their support. These negative comments were mainly about their 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 6 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 8
Positive-negative Christian Dems Free Dems Social Dems Figure 6 .2: Net positive party attitudes toward the EU, Germany opposition to the Single Market, which they tended to view as helping capitalists and hurting workers. This strategy did not work very well, and they shifted their position in the subsequent election to a more proEuropean stance. The Christian Democrats took a more negative view of the EU in the 1990 political campaign. This reflected party members' negative reaction to the commitment made by its leaders to a monetary union. The Free Democratic Party was a moderate supporter of the EU throughout the period. In the wake of the Single Market and the run up to the euro, the party increased its positive mentions of the EU. By the late 1990s, the EU was a frequent topic in party platforms, and all three parties had converged to a positive position. In Germany, the way to get the votes of the middle and upper-middle classes was to be pro-Europe. That all parties eventually came to adopt this position demonstrates that there were few votes to be won by opposing the EU. Figure 6 .3 presents similar data for Great Britain. Here one can see that the Labour and Conservative parties both tried to use the EU as a political issue. In 1974, the Labour Party was negative about joining the EU, while the Conservatives were positive about joining the EU. During the 1980s, the political parties switched positions. Labour favored the EU and the Conservatives, led by Thatcher and Major, opposed it. In the 1990s, the Conservative Party moderated their view and the Labour Party became even more supportive of the EU. It is interesting that even though Europe appeared to be an important wedge issue in British politics, eventually both main political parties realized that they lost more voters by subscribing to an anti-EU point of view than they gained.
Positive-negative
Conservatives Labour 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 7 Figure 6 .4 presents the data for France. The Gaullist party during the 1950s and 1960s was both positive and negative about the EU (and the comments cancelled one another out). On the one hand, de Gaulle himself did not like the EU because of his concerns about sovereignty. On the other hand, French business did very well as a result of EU membership. The Socialist Party was vaguely Europeanist during this same period. This was partially to distinguish itself from the Gaullists, but also because of France's leadership in the EU. Beginning in the early 1980s, this positive support went up as France's leadership in the EU was a source of national pride and European economic integration was viewed as a possible solution to economic stagnation. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, both main political parties in France grew increasingly supportive of the EU. They viewed France's role in Europe as mainly a function of its leadership in the EU. Monetary union was popular in France, and the German-French alliance that drove the EU was viewed as a positive thing. The National Front (an extreme right-wing party) intentionally decided to take an anti-EU stand in the 1990s, with the idea that opposing the EU and supporting the "nation" would work to get them votes. This position has worked to some degree. The National Front played an important role in the defeat of the European Constitution in France; but they still have not been able to win a national election on an anti-EU platform.
In the three biggest EU polities, we see a remarkably similar pattern. Over time, the EU has become a more salient issue for political parties, 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 7
Positive-negative Gaullists National Front Socialists German political parties all have come to support the EU despite having briefly flirted with an anti-EU platform. In France, the National Front is the only political party to try to run on an anti-EU agenda since the 1980s. Since their votes have tended to be protest votes against both immigrants and foreign trade, it is not surprising that they have taken an anti-EU stand. No major center left/center right European political party in the largest countries is likely to run against the EU, precisely because it is unpopular to do so. Middle-and upper-middle-class voters benefit from the EU and identify with it sufficiently that no political party can win an election on an explicitly anti-EU program. Large majorities in every society think that the EU has generally been a good thing for their country. Vocal minorities have caused parties to experiment with anti-EU stands. But the basic sense that the EU is positive means that politicians continue to support some forms of European integration.
Conclusion
There is little evidence for an outpouring of sentiment among the citizens of Europe supporting a European nation. Even in Brussels, where people work for the EU, the socialization of citizens as Europeans has been less than one might expect (Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005) . In spite of the obvious limits of survey data, the results presented here help make sense of much of why this is the case. Only 12.7 percent of the people living in Western Europe think of themselves as Europeans. While overall, 56 percent of people in Europe sometimes think of themselves as European, 44 percent still have only a national identity. For the 43.3 percent who sometimes think of themselves as European, they still think of themselves as being members of a nationstate first. Moreover, in Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, and Austria, majorities of the population never think of themselves as Europeans. Put simply, there are not enough people with strong European identities to push forward a Europe-wide political integration project. While there is a majority in most countries who sometimes think of themselves as European, this is clearly a shallow and situational identity. Building on the work of Karl Deutsch, I argue that for a national identity to emerge, a class alliance between elites and members of the middle and working classes has to become framed around a national "story." This story has to explain why everyone who lives within some geographic boundaries is part of a larger group, a group whose identity needs reinforcing by a state. The main mechanism by which this story gets told and spreads is through cultural communication. Groups from different classes have to meet in some organized setting, routinely interact, and come to view the other people as part of the same group.
It is the case that in Europe, the story of being "European" has only been told in a partial way. On the one hand, there has been increased communication and interaction among certain groups in Europe. People who are educated or are owners, managers, professionals, or white collar workers have had opportunities to meet and interact with their counterparts in other countries because of the EU's market and political integration project. For these people, this interaction has produced a positive European identity and support for the EU project, just as Deutsch would suggest. But for the vast majority of the population, these interactions are infrequent. For them, the national narrative still dominates. A substantial number of people in Europe sometimes think of themselves as Europeans (what might be called situational Europeans, that is, people who in some circumstances think of themselves as Europeans). But these people obviously do not share as many interactions with other Europeans.
The economic and social construction that has accompanied the growth of the EU since its inception in 1957 has produced a complex, if explicable politics. The goal of the member states' governments has consistently been to create a single market in western Europe, one that would eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers and eventually open all industries to competitors from other countries. This goal has created a huge increase in cross-border economic activity, trade, investment, and the creation of Europe-wide corporations. On the social side, the people who have been most involved in this market-opening project have been managers and professionals who have the opportunity to travel and work with their counterparts in other countries. These groups have benefited financially but have also had the pleasure of discovering that people in other countries could be friends, and travel and work bring them to new and interesting places. Meeting people from other societies has been a good thing that has encouraged people to see themselves as both similar and different.
Perhaps the most interesting and subtle effect of all of this economic and social interaction is the creation of interest in European affairs in national political discourse. There is strong evidence that European affairs are covered in national papers and that national groups organize to protest to their governments about EU policies they don't like. There is also some evidence that on occasion, these discussions can be transEuropean and result in policy coordination. But these discussions more frequently reflect the complex identities of people who live in Europe. Since the majority of those people have predominantly a national identity, it should not be surprising that many European political issues end up appealing to national as opposed to European-wide interests. This means that as issues confronting Europeans are discussed within national media, they are more likely to be filtered through national debates and self images than through European ones. So while there is certainly a wide awareness of European issues, the ability to produce European policies will always be difficult because of the institutional limits on the EU and the conflicting political demands that citizens place on their governments.
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It is useful to consider two scenarios for the future of European identity. One argues that we are at the limit of European identity and thus, the European national project will never happen. The other suggests forces that might push for an increase in European identity. First, let us consider the scenario for why European national identity will not emerge. For the majority of the European population, the opportunity to interact with people across borders has been greatly circumscribed, either by choice or by lack of opportunity. Blue collar, service workers, and the less educated have not had the opportunity to learn second languages or to interact for business or travel with their counterparts in other countries. As a result, they have lacked the impetus to see themselves as Europeans. Educated people and people with high status occupations are more likely to become at least partly Europeans, but there are not enough of them to have a big effect on creating a mass "European identity."
For blue collar and service workers, the EU has not delivered more jobs and jobs with better pay, but rather deindustrialization and globalization. There is the suspicion that the EU is an elite project that has mainly benefited the educated, and our evidence bears out that this is what people experience. The elderly still remember World War II and its aftermath. The elderly and the economically less privileged have less interest in knowing more about their neighbors and more in keeping a strong sense of national identity. Those politically on the right have created a politics to defend the nation. In some countries, they view the EU as intrusive on national sovereignty and by implication, on national identities. In others, they view immigrants as a threat to their livelihood and the nation. Perhaps the most divisive politics in Europe concerns the current rise in immigrants from Africa and the Middle East. Those who view this migration skeptically are distrustful of the EU and are satisfied with the national story.
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Now with enlargement to twenty-seven countries, a whole variety of people are entering the EU without a history of interacting with their counterparts across countries. The middle and upper-middle classes of what was formally Central and Eastern Europe do not necessarily feel affinity with the Western European project. There is already evidence that many of them feel ambivalent about their future in the EU, and their positions on Europe and having a European identity more closely approximate those who are skeptical than those who are optimistic. The existence of these new member states will mean even fewer citizens who will see Europe as for them and about people like them.
It is possible to present a scenario implying that the process of European identity building is just starting and that over time, the forces producing more Europeans will rise. First, the European project has only really been going on since the mid-1960s. The biggest expansion of opportunities to interact with other people in Europe occurred beginning with the Single Market in the mid-1980s. It just might be too early to see a majority emerging to create a European nation. After all, national identities took hundreds of years to evolve, and Europeans have only been interacting in large numbers for 20-25 years. Second, 7 Holmes's chapter in this volume discusses how the opponents of an enlightened, capitalist "Europe" think about what is going on. He argues that their version of what it means to be a "European" is more exclusionary of nonwhite and nonChristian groups.
demography is working in the EU's favor. Young people are more likely to know second languages, be educated, travel, and be more open to the EU. As older people pass away and are replaced by the young, there should be more people who think of themselves as Europeans. Third, as skill levels rise and education increases generally, people will be more interested in the cultural story of being with other Europeans. One of our more interesting results was the fact that educated people were the most likely to use a second language for travel and communication. As education levels rise, one would expect that the European identity would become more widespread. European issues are widely covered in the European press, and center left and center right parties generally continue to support the European project. Finally, as European markets continue to integrate, people will have more opportunities to interact with people in other countries. This could happen through work. Interaction will occur more generally as media coverage, tourism, and the awareness of culture in other countries expands. So, for example, the creation of a European football league would spark even more Europe-wide interest in games being played across Europe. Games would be televised, people would have the opportunity to follow foreign teams, and they would travel even more to support their teams.
All of these processes have yet to play out for the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe. Over time, Central and Eastern Europeans will travel west for work and school. Businesspeople will gradually become more integrated with their Western European counterparts, particularly those who work for multinational enterprises. If my analysis is right, the middle and upper-middle classes in Eastern Europe will eventually come to interact with and relate to their colleagues in Western Europe. This interaction will make them become more favorable toward European integration.
All in all, my analysis suggests that, first, given that 87.3 percent of the European electorates mainly think of themselves as national in identity, the most likely outcome will be for the national story to continue to trump the European one. The challenges of the future will be decided by the part of the population that is situationally European. As issues play out, the middle-class voters who sometimes think of themselves as Europeans will empower their governments to cooperate either more or less with other European governments. Second, which way they go will be part of a political process that involves framing around identities. One can imagine a particular event that would bring people in Europe closer together. A Europe-wide terrorist event, for example, might push forward a Europe-wide response and the sense that European citizens were in it together. One could also imagine an event that would split Europe up. A severe economic crisis in one of the large member states might tempt citizens to vote for a party that offered to protect national jobs by leaving the monetary union and the EU. This is where real history and politics will matter for what is to come. EU Positive/Negative Image: 0 = Very negative, fairly negative, neutral, 1 = fairly positive, very positive Gender: 0 = female, 1 = male Age: Age in years Age at school completion: Age in years during last year of school Income scale: Income was reported from all sources. It was converted into local currency. It was then converted into five groups for each country based on the income distribution. "1" is the lowest income group, while "5" is the highest.
Left-Right politics. The question asked was, "People talk about politics as being left and right. How would you place yourself on this scale?" Respondents were asked to place themselves on a five-point scale where "1" indicated the farthest "left" and "5" was the farthest right.
The occupational variables were coded based on the response to the following question: "What is your current occupation?" Respondents were given nineteen choices. I created a series of dummy variables whereby a person was coded "0" if they were in the category and "1" if they were not. The following groups were coded as "1" for each of the dummy variables.
Owner: 1 = Self employed, categories 5-9: Farmer, fisherman, professional, owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self employed, business proprietors, partner in a business.
Managers: 1 = General management, middle management, supervisor, categories 11, 12, 16 Country dummy variables; 0 = if respondent not in the country, 1 = respondent in the country. The "left out" category for all of the analyses is Great Britain.
All of the data analyses were done using logit regression models in the computer program SPSS. Logit regression is the appropriate technique when the dependent variable in a data analysis is "limited" (discrete, not continuous). Researchers often want to analyze whether some event occurred or not, such as voting, participation in a public program, business success or failure, morbidity, or mortality. Binary logistic regression is a type of regression analysis where the dependent variable is a dummy variable (coded 0, 1). More details on logit regression and its interpretation are available from Demaris (1992). For nontechnical readers, a positive statistically significant coefficient implies that more of variable X implies that it is more likely that the respondent will be in category "1" rather than category "0." So a positive coefficient on gender below implies that men are more likely to think of themselves as Europeans. A negative coefficient implies that as X increases, the probability that the respondent will be in category "0" increases. So, for example, in the case of European identity, age is negatively related to having a European identity. This means that older people are less likely to see themselves as Europeans. 
